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Food labeling has been the focus of major policy initiatives in the last few years. Some
have argued that a particular benefit of health-related labeling of food is that it may
effectively educate groups in the population not reachable by other approaches. The
literature has highlighted the degree of variability within the population in health-related
awareness, particularly in terms of education.
1  There is also some evidence that, at least
for some diet-disease relationships, the presence of health-related marketing may
decrease the gap in diet-disease awareness between individuals of different education
levels (Ippolito and Mathios 1996).  However, changes in diet-disease awareness does
not necessarily translate into changes in food purchase behavior. 
Several economic studies have examined the behavioral effects of
providing health-related information to consumers (Brown and
Schrader 1990, Putler 1987; Chang and Kinnucan 1991; Capps and
Schmitz 1991; Zuo and Chern 1996; Spreen and Gao 1993; Ippolito and
Mathios 1990, 96; Putler and Frazao 1991).  However, these studies have
focused on information provided by non-label sources (e.g., the news
media).  Levy et al (1985) and Levy and Stokes (1987) measured the market effects of
a nutrition labeling program, but they did not examine whether the effects were different
across consumers.  Mathios (1996) examined the relationship between food choices and
individual characteristics but was not able to isolate the effects of nutrition labeling.
                    
1 For a comprehensive review of this literature see Mathios (1996).3
The empirical literature indicates that nutrition information provided at the point
of purchase can affect market behavior, suggesting that changes in behavior are not
solely driven by non-point of purchase sources. However, little research has been
directed to determining whether point of purchase information has a differential effect on
different socio-economic groups.  This is potentially important since point-of-purchase
information may reach more consumers.  To bridge the existing gap in the literature we
use market data to measure the effects of providing simplified nutrient information on
consumer purchase behavior across different types of consumers.
Description of Data
The data are from a cooperative effort between Stop & Shop
Supermarkets and the U.S. Food and Drug Administration to test the
efficacy of nutrition shelf labeling (brand specific nutrition information
provided on the shelf in conjunction with the products' unit and item
price information).   A total of 25 Stop & Shop Supermarket stores in
Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Hampshire and Massachusetts were
included within the experiment.  Thirteen stores were designated as the
treatment group and 12 stores were chosen as the control group.  Socio-
demographic data for individuals who shopped at the stores were provided by Stop &4
Shop (the provided data were aggregated at the store level).
2  The stores span a broad
range of neighborhood characteristics. 
During 1985 both the treatment and control stores began using
shelf tags to provide products’ unit and item price information to
consumers.  From 1986 to 1989, the 13 stores in the treatment group
implemented a nutrition education program.  In the first year of the
program (1986), treatment stores exhibited shelf tags augmented with
nutrition information, distributed information booklets and displayed
posters that provided nutrition information and an explanation of the
shelf labeling program. In the second and third years of the program
(1987-88), the treatment stores provided only nutritional shelf labeling.
 During the entire period, the 12 stores in the control group provided
shelf labels that displayed only unit and item price information and did
not include any special nutrition information.  Monthly scanner-
obtained sales, price and promotional data were collected at the product
level for all participating stores during the entire time frame of the
experiment.
                    
2 The socio-demographic data are from proprietary data files collected by Stop & Shop
as part of their market research.  The data are collected by phone using a random-digit-5
Methods
The demand model used here is based on an AIDS framework (Deaton and
Muelbauer 1980) expanded to include information effects (Piggott et al. 1996) and
demographic characteristics (Muelbauer and Pashards 1981).   The expanded AIDS
model begins with the household’s expenditure function (e)
(1a) log [e(p, U, a(S; c), W; j)/kh ]= F(p, a(S; c), W; j) + b(p)U
where p denotes prices; U is some index of the household’s utility; a(
.) denotes an
awareness function which is influenced by information, S, and a vector of individual
characteristics that may affect information access costs, c; W, denotes other demand
influences (such as product taste or seasonality); j denotes a vector of household
demographic characteristics that may affect the relative weights given to health
assessments versus other quality attributes;
 and kh is a general measure of household size
to deflate the budget of the household to a ‘needs-corrected’ per capita basis (Deaton
and Muelbauer 1980).
Following the expanded AIDS model, we define the terms in (1a) for the
h
thhousehold, shopping in the m
th store in time period t as:
(1b) F( p, a(S; c), W; j) = a0 + Saihmt logPimt + (1/2) SSgijlogPimtlogPjmt,
(1c) aihmt = {xi + tiTt + f1iLmt + f2i(L mt Tt) + h1i Eh + h2i (L mt Eh)
+ w1i Ah + w2i (L mt Ah) + q1iSt + q2iWt},
                                                           
dial method and are screened for individuals who stated they shop at Stop & Shop food
stores.6
and
                      bj
(1d) b(p) = b0 P Pjt
where subscripts i and j denote goods; Tt is a time trend; Lmt is a nutritional labeling
indicator variable equal to one in treatment stores after the labeling program is
implemented and zero otherwise; (Lmt Tt), a label-trend interaction term, is included to
measure time-dependent nutritional labeling effects; Eh denotes the average number of
years of education for the adult shopper in the household; (Lmt Eh), a label-education
interaction term, is included to test whether there is any differential effect of the
nutritional labeling across households with different levels of education; Ah denotes the
average age of the adult shopper in the household; (Lmt Ah), a label-age interaction term,
is included to measure any differential effect of the nutritional labeling across age.  St and
Wt represent seasonal indicator variables.  St is equal to one in the summer months (June,
July, and August) and zero otherwise; and Wt is equal to one during the winter months
(December, January, and February) and zero otherwise; Pjmt is the price of good j sold in
store m at time t.
3
Taking the derivative of (1a) with respect to log Pimt and substituting for Uh
provides a share equation for the i
th good during time t at the household level,
(2) Wihmt = xi + tiTt + f1iLmt + f2i(L mt Tt) + h1i Eh + h2i (L mt Eh)
+ w1i Ah + w2i (L mt Ah) + q1iSt + q2iWt + S j gijlogPjmt + bilog(Yht/ kh P*t)
                    
3 Although gender and race have been found to influence nutrition label use, these
variables are not included in the analysis because there is little variation in the gender
variable across stores and the variation in the race variable is confounded with the
experimental design.7
where Wihmt = {(Pimt Xiht)/ Yht} is the share of household income spent on good ‘i’, Xjht
denotes the quantity of good j chosen by household h during time t, Yh is total household
income and log P* = F(·).
A benefit of the AIDS framework is that it fulfills the conditions required for
exact non-linear aggregation; the share equations derived from the AIDS model can be
seen as coming from a single representative household endowed with income Y and
facing market prices.  The aggregated equation is approximated by
 (3)  Wimt =  xi + tiTt + f1iLmt + f2i(L mt Tt) + h1i Em + h2i (L mt Em)
+ w1i Am  + w2i (L mt Am) + q1iSt + q2iWt + S j gijlogPjmt  + bilog(Ymt/P
*
t)
where log Ym is average household income divided by the average household size, Km,
included in the Stop & Shop data.
  The general expression for each equation in the demand system is as (3) except
that the prices for the goods of interest are now share-weighted prices
4, Em and Am are
represented by their respective means, and the dependent variable for the equation
representing all other goods is {¡mt -S j(Pjmt * Xjmt)}/ ¡mt , where ¡mt  is equal to the
calculated aggregate income for each store/time period.  The non-linear system of
equations is estimated using iterative seemingly unrelated regression with the adding-up,
                    
4 Following LaFrance (1992), the price of the commodity representing all other goods is
normalized to one, eliminating this ‘price’ from the right hand side of the estimating
equation (because log(1) = 0).8
homogeneity and symmetry conditions imposed on the system.
5  Given the data are time-
series, potential autocorrelation is corrected by following the procedures outlined by
Berndt and Savin (1975) and Piggott et al (1996).
The analysis of the impact of the nutrition labeling program focuses on several
categories of products that vary in terms of the size/composition of the choice set, and
vary in terms of the nutrition information being provided.  Each demand system is
composed of three equations: one equation for the varieties of the good that in the
treatment stores were labeled as “healthy”, one for the varieties that were not labeled in
the treatment stores (which we will designate as “unhealthy” for convenience), and one
equation for all other goods. Except for salad dressing (where multiple flavors are
represented in each equation), the products represented by the ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’
demand equations are relatively homogeneous across products within the category. 
Note that before implementation of the labeling program both ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’
goods are unlabeled.  ‘Healthy’ goods are labeled (unlabeled) in treatment (control)
stores after implementation of the labeling program; ‘unhealthy’ goods are not labeled in
either the treatment or control stores after implementation of the labeling program.
                    
5 All the models were estimated both with and without the restrictions imposed.  Using
the joint test procedure of Gallant (1987), we found no significant difference between the
restricted and unrestricted models.9
Results
Effects of the income, seasonal and price coefficients
With only one exception, all the significant income coefficients were negative,
suggesting that the share of income devoted to purchases of these food categories
decreases with increases in income, i.e., that these food items are not luxury goods.  All
significant own-price coefficients are also negative indicating that an increase in own-
price leads to a decrease in share; all significant cross-price coefficients indicate ‘healthy’
and ‘unhealthy’ products are substitute goods.  The coefficients on the seasonal variables
indicate that milk share decreases (increases) during the summer (winter).  Conversely,
mayonnaise and salad dressing shares increase during the summer months.  These results,
while not central to our thesis, conform with prior expectations and lend credence to the
estimation results.
Effects of the time, education and age coefficients
The time trend coefficients suggest that consumers were increasing their
expenditures on milk, cream cheese, and refried beans and decreasing their expenditures
on peanut butter and mayonnaise over time.  The results also suggest that, even without
the labeling program in place, they were moving their purchases from ‘unhealthy’ (high
fat) milk to ‘healthy’ (low fat).   However, the converse is true in the refried bean,
mayonnaise and salad dressing markets. 
Increases in education level appear to cause increased expenditure shares on
‘healthy’ milk, peanut butter and mayonnaise, but decreased expenditure shares on10
‘healthy’ cream cheese, refried beans and salad dressing.  Except for salad dressing, the
older the shopper the greater the shares of ‘unhealthy’ products.  There was no
differential effect of age on the shares of ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ salad dressing. 
Effects of nutritional labeling
Given the many cross-product terms, it is especially difficult to untangle from the
results all the effects of labeling. In addition, it may be true that information is causing
substitution between product classes.  In any event we can draw some conclusions from
the results.  The effect of the label-related coefficients (label, label-education and label-
age interaction terms) indicate that the presence of the labeling program increased
‘healthy’ milk, cream cheese, refried bean and peanut butter shares among all consumers.
 However, the labeling program decreased ‘healthy’ mayonnaise and salad dressing
shares.  Except for refried bean share (where there was no differential impact of the
labeling program across households with different education levels), the impact of the
labeling program is greatest among communities with less education.  Although the
impact of the labeling program reduces ‘healthy’ mayonnaise and salad dressing shares,
the education effect is consistent with the effect seen with the other food categories; the
market effect of the labeling program is greatest (most negative) among less educated
households.  Except for milk share (where there was no differential effect across age),
label-induced changes where lower among older households.11
Conclusions
The label-education interaction terms were consistent in their effects; they
decreased the main effect of the label-dummy coefficients for more educated individuals.
 Where the label-dummy terms indicated that the label increased the share of ‘healthy’
products, this effect was greatest among less educated individuals; and where the label-
dummy terms indicated that the label decreased the share of ‘healthy’ products, this
effect was also greatest among less educated individuals.  Interestingly, the size of the
label-education effect varied across product/nutrient categories. 
One explanation for these results is that more educated individuals may have
relatively ‘better’ (more accurate) priors about food products, although the accuracy of
these priors varies across product and nutrient categories.  If this is the case, then the
label information would have a lower market effect among more educated individuals
and the cost of ignorance would be lower among these individuals.  In essence, more
educated individuals may have already made their food purchase adjustments before
implementation of the labeling program.
The age coefficients consistently indicate that older individuals are more likely to
purchase ‘unhealthy’ products. The label-age interaction terms are also consistent in
dampening the main effect of the label-dummy coefficients for older individuals.  Where
the label-dummy terms indicate that the label increases the share of ‘healthy’ products,
this effect is smallest for older individuals; where the label decreased the share of12
‘healthy’ products, this effect is also smallest among older individuals. These effects
seem consistent with results indicating that older individuals are less likely to be aware of
diet-disease issues and are less likely to use health-related information.
6  These results
may be due to older individuals facing higher information ‘costs’ (due to reduced
cognitive and visual abilities).  Alternatively, older individuals may see themselves as
obtaining relatively little benefit from ‘healthy’ eating (due to a shorter expected future
life).
                    
6 An alternative explanation is that older individuals may be less likely to trust nutrition
label information.  However, Derby (1995) indicates that older individuals find nutrition
labels to be more credible.13








Label dummy 0.00097717*** 0.00019495
Label * Time 8.096599E-6*** 3.143424E-6*
Education 0.00022431*** 0.000026413
Label * Education  -0.00008763*** -4.84313E-6
Age -0.0000306*** 0.000016134***
Label * Age 1.310175E-6 -0.00001026
Summer -0.00001772* -0.00003785**
Winter 0.000027674*** 0.00005783***
Own Price -0.00067253*** -0.00142292***







Label dummy 0.00020976* 0.00064997***
Label * Time -1.42723E-6*** -8.42554E-7**
Education 2.276292E-6 0.000022642***
Label * Education  -2.50027E-6 -0.00002554***
Age -1.00436E-6 2.194424E-6**
Label * Age -4.93605E-6* -0.00001081***
Summer -7.46995E-6* 6.759045E-6*
Winter 9.230628E-7 -6.19534E-6
Own Price -0.00029665*** -0.00022318***







Label dummy 0.000037992*** 0.00011964***
Label * Time 5.7282E-8** 5.110419E-8
Education 1.867662E-6*** 4.308723E-6***
Label * Education  -4.95881E-8 2.840756E-7
Age -5.23096E-7*** -1.76375E-7
Label * Age -1.14459E-6*** -3.80405E-6***
Summer 1.303398E-7 1.179822E-6*
Winter 3.278641E-7 2.552361E-6***
Own Price -1.28502E-6 8.066438E-7








Label dummy 0.00072042*** -0.00005873
Label * Time -1.00849E-7 1.615042E-6***
Education 0.00007779*** -8.84583E-6*
Label * Education  -0.0000363*** 0.000020751***
Age 3.687094E-6*** 6.421512E-6***
Label * Age -9.22779E-6*** -5.97764E-6***
Summer -0.00001363*** 5.974863E-7
Winter 8.66533E-7 4.939838E-6
Own Price -0.00010986*** -2.3764E-7







Label dummy -0.0002* 2.84E-06**
Label * Time 2.8E-06*** 5.56E-07***
Education 8.9E-06* -3.1E-06
Label * Education  4.5E-06 3.31E-05***
Age -2.9E-06** 5.05E-06**
Label * Age 2.84E-06 -1.4E-06***
Summer 0.00003*** 2.6E-06***
Winter -9E-06** -2.1E-06
Own Price -0.00023*** -0.00007







Label dummy -0.00045*** 0.000653***
Label * Time 9.19E-07* -2.37E-06***
Education -1.40E-05*** 4.53E-05***
Label * Education  1.40E-05*** -1.65E-05***
Age 6.00E-06*** 6.02E-06***
Label * Age 7.00E-06*** -1.32E-05***
Summer 1.70E-05*** 4.16E-05***
Winter -3.00E-06 8.73E-06*
Own Price -1.50E-04* -1.10E-05
Cross Price 3.00E-05 3.00E-05
An * denotes significance at the 10 percent level, ** denotes significance at the five percent level and
*** denotes significance at the one percent level.15
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